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产业组织：战略方法（英文版）
作者：Jeffrey ChurchRoger Ware
出版社：清华大学出版社
出版时间：2000-11-01
ISBN：9787302040903
定价：¥86.00
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内容简介
“产业组织理论（TheoryoflndustrialOrganization）”是微观经济学的一个主要应用分支，它研究在各种市场结构中厂商的行为和政府的角色。本书是一本产业组织理论的最新教材，被美国和加拿大的很多著名院校广泛采用。它的第一个特点是内容非常齐全，包括了垄断定价理论、产品质量和市场竞争力、博弈论和寡头竞争模型、广告策略、新产品研发、反托拉斯经济学和政府管制理论等。其中对政府管制理论的分析非常详尽、透彻，弥补了其他产业组织理论教材的——个不足之处。这本教材的另一个特点是它的正文、案例、例题、习题等的搭配非常合理，这对培养学生的分析问题能力很有益处，对教师组织教学也很有帮助。另外，博弈论理论（GameTheory）最新研究成果的广泛应用是区分新旧“产业组织理论”的分水岭。这本教材内容的组织紧紧围绕“策略”这一主线，它是真正意义上的新“产业组织理论”。“产业组织理论”之所以越来越受到学术界和政府决策机构的重视，一个重要原因是它能为政府反托拉斯（Antitrust）法的制订提供理论依据。该书的两位作者分别担仟过力口拿大竞争局（the范CanadianCompetitionBureau）产业经济主席和渥太华竞争局（theCompetitionBureau，Ottawa）产业组织主席。教材中有很多有关反托拉斯方面的案例分析，用来检验产业组织理论模型的效果。这在其他同类教材中是不多见的。本书适合各大专院校经济管理类专业本科生、研究生和MBA用作产业组织理论教材，也可供经济管理类研究人员用作参考书。
作者简介
暂缺《产业组织：战略方法（英文版）》作者简介
目录
I Foundations
Introduction
1.1 A More Formal Introduction to IO
1.1.1
The Demand for Industrial Organization
1.2 Methodologies
1.2.1
The New Industrial Organization
1.2.2 The Theory of Business Strategy
1.2.3 Antitrust Law
1.3 Overview of the Text
1.3.1 Foundations
1.3.2 Monopoly
1.3.3 Oligopoly Pricing
1.3.4 Strategic Behavior
1.3.5 Issues in Antitrust Economics
1.3.6 Issues in Regulatory Economics
1.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
The Welfare Economics of Market Power
2.1 Profit Maximization
2.2 Perfect Competition
2.2.1 Supply
2.2.2 Market Equilibrium
2.3 Efficiency
2.3.1
Measures of Gains from Trade
2.3.2 Pareto Optimality
2.4 Market Power
2.4.1
Market Power and Pricing
2.4.2 Measurement and Determinants of Market Power
2.4.3 The Determinants of Deadweight Loss
2.5 Market Power and Public Policy
2.6 Chapter Summary
2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Theory of the Firm
3.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Firm
3.1.1 Review of Cost Concepts
3.1.2 The Potential Advantages of Being Large
3.1.3 Economies of Scale and Seller Concentration
3.2 Why Do Firms Exist
3.2.1
Two Puzzles Regarding the Scope of a Firm
3.2.2 Explanations for the Existence of Firms
3.2.3 Alternative Economic Organizations
3.2.4 Spot Markets
3.2.5 Specific Investments and Quasi-Rents
3.2.6 Contracts
3.2.7 Complete vs. Incomplete Contracts
3.2.8 Vertical Integration
3.3 Limits to Firm Size
3.3.1
The Paradox of Selective Intervention
3.3.2 Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
3.4 Do Firms Profit Maximize
3.4.1
Shareholder Monitoring and Incentive Contracts
3.4.2 External Limits to Managerial Discretion
3.5 Chapter Summary
3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
II Monopoly
4 Market Power and Dominant Firms
4.1 Sources of Market Power
4.1.1
Government Restrictions on Entry
4.1.2 Structural Characteristics
4.1.3 Strategic Behavior by Incumbents
4.2 A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
4.2.1 The Effect of Entry
4.3 Durable Goods Monopoly
4.3.1
The Coase Conjecture
4.3.2 Pacman Economics
4.3.3 Coase vs. Pacman
4.3.4 Recycling
4.4 Market Power: A Second Look
4.4.1 X-Inefficiency
4.4.2 Rent Seeking
4.5 Benefits of Monopoly
4.5.1
Scale Economies
4.5.2 Research and Development
4.6 Chapter Summary
4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Non-Linear Pricing and Price Discrimination
5.1 Examples of Price Discrimination
5.2 Mechanisms for Capturing Surplus
5.3 Market Power and Arbitrage: Necessary Conditions for Price Discrimination
5.4 Types of Price Discrimination
5.4.1
First-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.4 General Non-Linear Pricing
5.4.5 Optimal Non-Linear Pricing
5.5 Antitrust Treatment of Price Discrimination
5.6 Chapter Summary
5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
6 Market Power and Product Quality
6.1 Search Goods
6.1.1
Monopoly Provision of Quality
6.1.2 Quality Discrimination
6.2 Experience Goods and Quality
6.2.1
Moral Hazard and the Provision of Quality
6.2.2 The Lemons Problem
6.3 Signaling High Quality
6.3.1
A Dynamic Model of Reputation for Quality
6.3.2 Advertising as a Signal of Quality
6.3.3 Warranties
6.4 Chapter Summary
6.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
6.6 Appendix: The Complete Model of Quality Discrimination
III Oligopoly Pricing
Game Theory I
7.1 Why Game Theory
7.2 Foundations and Principles
7.2.1
The Basic Elements of a Game
7.2.2 Types of Games
7.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts
7.2.4 Fundamental Assumptions
7.3 Static Games of Complete Information
7.3.1
Normal Form Representation
7.3.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies
7.3.3 Rationalizable Strategies
7.3.4 Nash Equilibrium
7.3.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Nash Equilibria
7.3.6 Mixed Strategies
7.4 Chapter Summary
7.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
7.6 Appendix: Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Strategies
8 Classic Models of Oligopoly
8.1 Static Oligopoly Models
8.2 Cournot
8.2.1
Cournot Best-Response Functions and Residual Demand Functions
8.2.2 Properties of the Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.3 Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.4 The Efficient Number of Competitors
8 3 Bertrand Competition
8.3.1
The Bertrand Paradox
8.3.2 Product Differentiation
8.3.3 Capacity Constraints
8.4 Cournot vs. Bertrand
8.5 Empirical Tests of Oligopoly
8.5.1
Conjectural Variations
8.6 Chapter Summary
8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
8.8 Appendix: Best-Response Functions, Reaction Functions, and Stability
8.8.1 Stability
8.8.2 Uniqueness
Game Theory II
9.1 Extensive Forms
9.2 Strategies vs. Actions and Nash Equilibria
9.3 Noncredible Threats
9.3.1
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
9.3.2 The Centipede Game
9.4 Two-Stage Games
9.5 Games of Almost Perfect Information
9.5.1 Finitely Repeated Stage Game
9.5.2 Infinitely Repeated Stage Game
9.6 Chapter Summary
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
9.8 Appendix: Discounting
10 Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
10.1 Reaching an Agreement
10.1.1 Profitability of Collusion
10.1.2 How Is an Agreement Reached
10.1.3 Factors That Complicate Reaching an Agreement
10.2 Stronger, Swifter, More Certain
10.3 Dynamic Games
10.3.1 Credible Punishments and Subgame Perfection: Finite Games
10.4 Supergames
10.4.1 Subgame Perfection and Credible Threats: Infinite Game
10.4.2 Harsher Punishment Strategies
10.4.3 Renegotiation Proof Strategies
10.5 Factors That Influence the Sustainability of Collusion
10.6 Facilitating Practices
10.6.1 Efficiency and Facilitating Practices
10.7 Antitrust and Collusion
10.8 Chapter Summary
10.9 Suggestions for Further Reading
11 Product Differentiation
11.1 What Is Product Differentiation
11.2 Monopolistic Competition
11.2.1 Preference Specification
11.2.2 Monopolistic Competition: Equilibrium
11.2.3 Too Many Brands of Toothpaste
11.3 Bias in Product Selection
11.3.1 Asymmetric Preferences
11.4 Address Models
11.4.1 Consumer Preferences
11.4.2 A Simple Address Model: Hotelling''s Linear City
11.4.3 Free Entry into the Linear City
11.4.4 Localized Competition
11.4.5 Efficiency of the Market Equilibrium
11.4.6 Endogenous Pricing
11.4.7 Pricing and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation
11.5 Strategic Behavior
11.5.1 Brand Proliferation
11.5.2 Brand Specification
11.5.3 Brand Preemption
11.6 Oligopoly Equilibrium in Vertically Differentiated Markets
11.7 Chapter Summary
11.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
12 Identifying and Measuring Market Power
12.1 Structure, Conduct, and Performance
12.1.1 SCP in Practice: The Framework
12.1.2 SCP in Practice: The Results
12.1.3 Critiques of SCP Studies
12.2 The New Empirical Industrial Organization
12.2.1 Structural Models
12.2.2 Nonparametric, or Reduced-Form, Approaches
12.3 The NEIO and SCP: A Summing Up
12.4 Chapter Summary
12.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
IV Strategic Behavior
13 An Introduction to Strategic Behavior
13.1 Strategic Behavior
13.1.1 Strategic vs. Tactical Choices
13.2 The Stackelberg Game
13.2.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium
13.3 Entry Deterrence
13.3.1 Constant Returns to Scale
13.3.2 Economies of Scale
13.4 Introduction to Entry Games
13.4.1 Limit Pricing
13.4.2 A Stylized Entry Game
13.5 Chapter Summary
13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
14 Entry Deterrence
14.1
The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence
14.1.1 Dixit''s Model of Entry Deterrence
14.1.2 Strategic Investment and Monopolization
14.2 Contestable Markets
14.2.1 Logical Possibility
14.2.2 Robustness
14.2.3 Empirical Relevance
14.2.4 Contestability and Barriers to Entry
14.3
Entry Barriers
14.3.1 Positive Definitions of Barriers to Entry
14.3.2 An Assessment of Barriers to Entry
14.3.3 Normative Definitions of Entry Barriers
14.4 Chapter Summary
14.5
Suggestions for Further Reading
15 Strategic Behavior: Principles
15.1
Two-Stage Games
15.2
Strategic Accommodation
15.3
Strategic Entry Deterrence
15.4 The Welfare Effects of Strategic Competition
15.5 Chapter Summary
15.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
16 Strategic Behavior: Applications
16.1
Learning by Doing
16.1.1 Learning with Price Competition
16.1.2 Learning and Entry Deterrence
16.2 Switching Costs
16.2.1 Strategic Manipulation of an Installed Base of Customers
16.2.2 Incorporating New Buyers
16.2.3 Endogenous Switching Costs
16.3 Vertical Separation
16.4 Tying
16.5 Strategic Trade Policy I: Export Subsidies to Regional Jets
16.6 Strategic Trade Policy Il:. The Kodak-Fujifilm Case
16.7 Managerial Incentives
16.8 Research and Development
16.9 The Coase Conjecture Revisited
16.10 Chapter Summary
16.11 Suggestions for Further Reading
17 Advertising and Oligopoly
17.1 Normative vs. Positive Issues: The Welfare Economics of Advertising
17.2 Positive Issues: Theoretical Analysis of Advertising and Oligopoly
17.2.1 Advertising as an Exogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.2 Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.3 Cooperative and Predatory Advertising
17.3 Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence
17.4 A More General Treatment of Strategic Advertising: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
17.5 Positive Issues: Advertising and Oligopoly Empirics
17.6 Chapter Summary
17.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
18 Research and Development
18.1 A Positive Analysis: Strategic R&D
18.2 Market Structure and Incentives for R&D
18.2.1 A More Careful View of Market Structure
18.2.2 Patent Races
18.2.3 Stochastic Patent Races
18.2.4 Product Innovation and Patent Races
18.3 Normative Analysis: The Economics of Patents
18.3.1 Other Forms of Intellectual Property Protection:
Copyrights and Trademarks
18.4 Chapter Summary
18.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
V Issues in Antitrust Economics
19 The Theory of the Market
19.1 The Concept of a Market
19.1.1 Economic Markets
19.1.2 Antitrust Markets
19.2 Antitrust Markets: The Search for Market Power
19.2.1 Market Power and Antitrust
19.2.2 Market Power and Market Shares
19.2.3 The Importance of Demand Elasticities
19.2.4 Critical Elasticities of Demand
19.2.5 Break-Even Elasticities of Demand
19.2.6 Recent Developments: Innovation Markets
19.3 The Practice of Market Definition
19.3.1 Demand Elasticities
19.3.2 The Structural Approach
19.3.3 Shipment Flows
19.3.4 Qualitative Evaluative Criteria
19.4 Antitrust Markets in Monopolization Cases: The Cellophane Fallacy
19.4.1 The Cellophane Fallacy and Mergers
19.5 Chapter Summary
19.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
20 Exclusionary Strategies I: Raising Rivals'' Costs
20.1 A Simple Model of Raising Rivals'' Costs
20.2 The Salop and Scheffman Model: Raising the Costs of a Competitive Fringe
20.3 Accommodation vs. Deterrence Strategies
20.4 A More General Treatment of Raising Rivals'' Costs: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
20.5 Reducing Rivals'' Revenue
20.6 Raising Rivals'' Costs in Antitrust
20.7 Chapter Summary
20.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
21 Exclusionary Strategies II: Predatory Pricing
21.1 The Classic Chicago Attack on Predation
21.2 Rational Theories of Predation
21.2.1 The Long Purse
21.2.2 Reputation Models
21.2.3 Signaling Models of Predation
21.2.4 Softening Up the Victim
21.2.5 Predation in Learning and Network Industries
21.3 Empirical Evidence on Predation
21.3.1 Case Studies
21.3.2 Experimental Evidence
21.4 Predation in Antitrust
21.4.1 Areeda-Turner and Cost-Based Definitions of Predation
21.4.2 Major Antitrust Cases
21.5 Chapter Summary
21.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
21.7 Appendix: An Introduction to Games of Incomplete Information
21.7.1 Bayesian Games
21.7.2 Extensive-Form Bayesian Games with Observable Actions
21.7.3 Multiple but Finite Numbers of Victims in the Extortion Game
22 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints
22.1 Incentives for Vertical Merger Vertical Integration
22.1.1 Transaction Economies
22.1.2 Vertical Integration to Avoid Double Marginalization
22.1.3 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Fixed Proportions
22.1.4 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Variable Proportions
22.2 Vertical Restraints
22.2.1 Restraints on Intrabrand Competition
22.2.2 Alternative Explanations of RPM and Exclusive Territorial Restrictions
22.2.3 RPM, Exclusive Territories, and Welfare
22.2.4 Antitrust Policy toward RPM and Exclusive Territories
22.3 Contractual Exclusivity
22.3.1 Tying Arrangements
22.3.2 Exclusive Dealing
22.4 Chapter Summary
22.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
22.6 Appendix: Price versus Non-Price Competition in the Winter Model
23 Horizontal Mergers
23.1 A Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
23.1.1 Price versus Efficiency: The Williamson Trade Off
23.1.2 The Use of the Herfindahl Index in Merger Analysis
23.2 Equilibrium with Nonmerging Firms: A More General Analysis
23.2.1 Mergers in Differentiated Markets
23.3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers
23.4 Entry
23.5 Mergers: The Antitrust Framework
23.5.1 Merger Guidelines
23.5.2 Market Definition
23.5.3 Innovation Markets
23.5.4 Entry and Product Repositioning
23.5.5 Efficiencies: A Growing Emphasis
23.5.6 Methodology: The Growing Role of Simulation in Antitrust Analysis
23.6 Chapter Summary
23.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
23.8 Appendix: Bertrand Equilibrium with Three Differentiated Products
VI Issues in Regulatory Economics
24 Rationale for Regulation
24.1 Public Interest Justifications for Regulatory Intervention
24.1. l The Market Failure Test
24.1.2 Natural Monopoly
24.1.3 Large Specific Investments
24.2 The Economic Theories of Regulation
24.2.1 The Theory of Economic Regulation
24.2.2 Explaining Regulation Using a Principal-Agent Approach
24.3 Chapter Summary
24.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
24.5 Appendix: Subadditivity and Multiproduct Firms
25 Optimal Pricing for Natural Monopoly
25.1 Efficient Pricing by a Single-Product Natural Monopolist
25.1.1 First-Best Pricing
25.1.2 Second-Best Pricing: Ramsey Prices
25.1.3 First- vs. Second-Best Pricing
25.2 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly
25.2.1 Ramsey Pricing
25.3 Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.1 A Simple Illustrative Model of Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.2 Optimal Capacity
25.3.3 Discussion of Peak-Load Pricing
25.4 Multipart Tariffs
25.4.1 Two Common Examples of Multipart Tariffs
25.4.2 The Coase Result
25.4.3 N-Part Tariffs and a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs
25.4.4 Pareto-Dominating Block Tariffs
25.5 Chapter Summary
25.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
26 Issues in Regulation
26.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information
26.1.1 The Full-Information Benchmark
26.1.2 Asymmetric Information: The Importance of Distributional
Considerations
26.1.3 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Information
26.1.4 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Action
26.1.5 Implications for Regulatory Regimes
26.2 Regulation in Practice
26.2.1 Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.2 An Assessment of COS Regulation
26.2.3 Summary of Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.4 Incentive Regulation
26.2.5 Guidelines for Regulation
26.3 Regulatory Reform in Network Industries
26.3.1 Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets
26.3.2 Access Pricing and Interconnection
26.3.3 The Interconnection Problem
26.3.4 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
26.3.5 Optimal Access Pricing
26.4 Chapter Summary
26.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
Appendix The Legal Framework of Antitrust Enforcement
A.1 Antitrust in the United States
A.I.1 The Sherman Act
A. 1.2 The Clayton Act
A.I.3 Enforcement in the U.S.
A.2 Competition Policy in Canada
A.2.1 Criminal Provisions in the Competition Act
A.2.2 The Director of Research and Investigation
A.2.3 Noncriminal Reviewable Offenses
A.3 Competition Policy of the European Union
A.3.1 Enforcement in the EU
A.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
Selected Solutions for Odd Numbered Questions
Index of Names
Subject Index
Introduction
1.1 A More Formal Introduction to IO
1.1.1
The Demand for Industrial Organization
1.2 Methodologies
1.2.1
The New Industrial Organization
1.2.2 The Theory of Business Strategy
1.2.3 Antitrust Law
1.3 Overview of the Text
1.3.1 Foundations
1.3.2 Monopoly
1.3.3 Oligopoly Pricing
1.3.4 Strategic Behavior
1.3.5 Issues in Antitrust Economics
1.3.6 Issues in Regulatory Economics
1.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
The Welfare Economics of Market Power
2.1 Profit Maximization
2.2 Perfect Competition
2.2.1 Supply
2.2.2 Market Equilibrium
2.3 Efficiency
2.3.1
Measures of Gains from Trade
2.3.2 Pareto Optimality
2.4 Market Power
2.4.1
Market Power and Pricing
2.4.2 Measurement and Determinants of Market Power
2.4.3 The Determinants of Deadweight Loss
2.5 Market Power and Public Policy
2.6 Chapter Summary
2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Theory of the Firm
3.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Firm
3.1.1 Review of Cost Concepts
3.1.2 The Potential Advantages of Being Large
3.1.3 Economies of Scale and Seller Concentration
3.2 Why Do Firms Exist
3.2.1
Two Puzzles Regarding the Scope of a Firm
3.2.2 Explanations for the Existence of Firms
3.2.3 Alternative Economic Organizations
3.2.4 Spot Markets
3.2.5 Specific Investments and Quasi-Rents
3.2.6 Contracts
3.2.7 Complete vs. Incomplete Contracts
3.2.8 Vertical Integration
3.3 Limits to Firm Size
3.3.1
The Paradox of Selective Intervention
3.3.2 Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
3.4 Do Firms Profit Maximize
3.4.1
Shareholder Monitoring and Incentive Contracts
3.4.2 External Limits to Managerial Discretion
3.5 Chapter Summary
3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
II Monopoly
4 Market Power and Dominant Firms
4.1 Sources of Market Power
4.1.1
Government Restrictions on Entry
4.1.2 Structural Characteristics
4.1.3 Strategic Behavior by Incumbents
4.2 A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
4.2.1 The Effect of Entry
4.3 Durable Goods Monopoly
4.3.1
The Coase Conjecture
4.3.2 Pacman Economics
4.3.3 Coase vs. Pacman
4.3.4 Recycling
4.4 Market Power: A Second Look
4.4.1 X-Inefficiency
4.4.2 Rent Seeking
4.5 Benefits of Monopoly
4.5.1
Scale Economies
4.5.2 Research and Development
4.6 Chapter Summary
4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Non-Linear Pricing and Price Discrimination
5.1 Examples of Price Discrimination
5.2 Mechanisms for Capturing Surplus
5.3 Market Power and Arbitrage: Necessary Conditions for Price Discrimination
5.4 Types of Price Discrimination
5.4.1
First-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.4 General Non-Linear Pricing
5.4.5 Optimal Non-Linear Pricing
5.5 Antitrust Treatment of Price Discrimination
5.6 Chapter Summary
5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
6 Market Power and Product Quality
6.1 Search Goods
6.1.1
Monopoly Provision of Quality
6.1.2 Quality Discrimination
6.2 Experience Goods and Quality
6.2.1
Moral Hazard and the Provision of Quality
6.2.2 The Lemons Problem
6.3 Signaling High Quality
6.3.1
A Dynamic Model of Reputation for Quality
6.3.2 Advertising as a Signal of Quality
6.3.3 Warranties
6.4 Chapter Summary
6.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
6.6 Appendix: The Complete Model of Quality Discrimination
III Oligopoly Pricing
Game Theory I
7.1 Why Game Theory
7.2 Foundations and Principles
7.2.1
The Basic Elements of a Game
7.2.2 Types of Games
7.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts
7.2.4 Fundamental Assumptions
7.3 Static Games of Complete Information
7.3.1
Normal Form Representation
7.3.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies
7.3.3 Rationalizable Strategies
7.3.4 Nash Equilibrium
7.3.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Nash Equilibria
7.3.6 Mixed Strategies
7.4 Chapter Summary
7.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
7.6 Appendix: Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Strategies
8 Classic Models of Oligopoly
8.1 Static Oligopoly Models
8.2 Cournot
8.2.1
Cournot Best-Response Functions and Residual Demand Functions
8.2.2 Properties of the Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.3 Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.4 The Efficient Number of Competitors
8 3 Bertrand Competition
8.3.1
The Bertrand Paradox
8.3.2 Product Differentiation
8.3.3 Capacity Constraints
8.4 Cournot vs. Bertrand
8.5 Empirical Tests of Oligopoly
8.5.1
Conjectural Variations
8.6 Chapter Summary
8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
8.8 Appendix: Best-Response Functions, Reaction Functions, and Stability
8.8.1 Stability
8.8.2 Uniqueness
Game Theory II
9.1 Extensive Forms
9.2 Strategies vs. Actions and Nash Equilibria
9.3 Noncredible Threats
9.3.1
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
9.3.2 The Centipede Game
9.4 Two-Stage Games
9.5 Games of Almost Perfect Information
9.5.1 Finitely Repeated Stage Game
9.5.2 Infinitely Repeated Stage Game
9.6 Chapter Summary
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
9.8 Appendix: Discounting
10 Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
10.1 Reaching an Agreement
10.1.1 Profitability of Collusion
10.1.2 How Is an Agreement Reached
10.1.3 Factors That Complicate Reaching an Agreement
10.2 Stronger, Swifter, More Certain
10.3 Dynamic Games
10.3.1 Credible Punishments and Subgame Perfection: Finite Games
10.4 Supergames
10.4.1 Subgame Perfection and Credible Threats: Infinite Game
10.4.2 Harsher Punishment Strategies
10.4.3 Renegotiation Proof Strategies
10.5 Factors That Influence the Sustainability of Collusion
10.6 Facilitating Practices
10.6.1 Efficiency and Facilitating Practices
10.7 Antitrust and Collusion
10.8 Chapter Summary
10.9 Suggestions for Further Reading
11 Product Differentiation
11.1 What Is Product Differentiation
11.2 Monopolistic Competition
11.2.1 Preference Specification
11.2.2 Monopolistic Competition: Equilibrium
11.2.3 Too Many Brands of Toothpaste
11.3 Bias in Product Selection
11.3.1 Asymmetric Preferences
11.4 Address Models
11.4.1 Consumer Preferences
11.4.2 A Simple Address Model: Hotelling''s Linear City
11.4.3 Free Entry into the Linear City
11.4.4 Localized Competition
11.4.5 Efficiency of the Market Equilibrium
11.4.6 Endogenous Pricing
11.4.7 Pricing and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation
11.5 Strategic Behavior
11.5.1 Brand Proliferation
11.5.2 Brand Specification
11.5.3 Brand Preemption
11.6 Oligopoly Equilibrium in Vertically Differentiated Markets
11.7 Chapter Summary
11.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
12 Identifying and Measuring Market Power
12.1 Structure, Conduct, and Performance
12.1.1 SCP in Practice: The Framework
12.1.2 SCP in Practice: The Results
12.1.3 Critiques of SCP Studies
12.2 The New Empirical Industrial Organization
12.2.1 Structural Models
12.2.2 Nonparametric, or Reduced-Form, Approaches
12.3 The NEIO and SCP: A Summing Up
12.4 Chapter Summary
12.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
IV Strategic Behavior
13 An Introduction to Strategic Behavior
13.1 Strategic Behavior
13.1.1 Strategic vs. Tactical Choices
13.2 The Stackelberg Game
13.2.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium
13.3 Entry Deterrence
13.3.1 Constant Returns to Scale
13.3.2 Economies of Scale
13.4 Introduction to Entry Games
13.4.1 Limit Pricing
13.4.2 A Stylized Entry Game
13.5 Chapter Summary
13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
14 Entry Deterrence
14.1
The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence
14.1.1 Dixit''s Model of Entry Deterrence
14.1.2 Strategic Investment and Monopolization
14.2 Contestable Markets
14.2.1 Logical Possibility
14.2.2 Robustness
14.2.3 Empirical Relevance
14.2.4 Contestability and Barriers to Entry
14.3
Entry Barriers
14.3.1 Positive Definitions of Barriers to Entry
14.3.2 An Assessment of Barriers to Entry
14.3.3 Normative Definitions of Entry Barriers
14.4 Chapter Summary
14.5
Suggestions for Further Reading
15 Strategic Behavior: Principles
15.1
Two-Stage Games
15.2
Strategic Accommodation
15.3
Strategic Entry Deterrence
15.4 The Welfare Effects of Strategic Competition
15.5 Chapter Summary
15.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
16 Strategic Behavior: Applications
16.1
Learning by Doing
16.1.1 Learning with Price Competition
16.1.2 Learning and Entry Deterrence
16.2 Switching Costs
16.2.1 Strategic Manipulation of an Installed Base of Customers
16.2.2 Incorporating New Buyers
16.2.3 Endogenous Switching Costs
16.3 Vertical Separation
16.4 Tying
16.5 Strategic Trade Policy I: Export Subsidies to Regional Jets
16.6 Strategic Trade Policy Il:. The Kodak-Fujifilm Case
16.7 Managerial Incentives
16.8 Research and Development
16.9 The Coase Conjecture Revisited
16.10 Chapter Summary
16.11 Suggestions for Further Reading
17 Advertising and Oligopoly
17.1 Normative vs. Positive Issues: The Welfare Economics of Advertising
17.2 Positive Issues: Theoretical Analysis of Advertising and Oligopoly
17.2.1 Advertising as an Exogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.2 Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.3 Cooperative and Predatory Advertising
17.3 Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence
17.4 A More General Treatment of Strategic Advertising: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
17.5 Positive Issues: Advertising and Oligopoly Empirics
17.6 Chapter Summary
17.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
18 Research and Development
18.1 A Positive Analysis: Strategic R&D
18.2 Market Structure and Incentives for R&D
18.2.1 A More Careful View of Market Structure
18.2.2 Patent Races
18.2.3 Stochastic Patent Races
18.2.4 Product Innovation and Patent Races
18.3 Normative Analysis: The Economics of Patents
18.3.1 Other Forms of Intellectual Property Protection:
Copyrights and Trademarks
18.4 Chapter Summary
18.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
V Issues in Antitrust Economics
19 The Theory of the Market
19.1 The Concept of a Market
19.1.1 Economic Markets
19.1.2 Antitrust Markets
19.2 Antitrust Markets: The Search for Market Power
19.2.1 Market Power and Antitrust
19.2.2 Market Power and Market Shares
19.2.3 The Importance of Demand Elasticities
19.2.4 Critical Elasticities of Demand
19.2.5 Break-Even Elasticities of Demand
19.2.6 Recent Developments: Innovation Markets
19.3 The Practice of Market Definition
19.3.1 Demand Elasticities
19.3.2 The Structural Approach
19.3.3 Shipment Flows
19.3.4 Qualitative Evaluative Criteria
19.4 Antitrust Markets in Monopolization Cases: The Cellophane Fallacy
19.4.1 The Cellophane Fallacy and Mergers
19.5 Chapter Summary
19.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
20 Exclusionary Strategies I: Raising Rivals'' Costs
20.1 A Simple Model of Raising Rivals'' Costs
20.2 The Salop and Scheffman Model: Raising the Costs of a Competitive Fringe
20.3 Accommodation vs. Deterrence Strategies
20.4 A More General Treatment of Raising Rivals'' Costs: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
20.5 Reducing Rivals'' Revenue
20.6 Raising Rivals'' Costs in Antitrust
20.7 Chapter Summary
20.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
21 Exclusionary Strategies II: Predatory Pricing
21.1 The Classic Chicago Attack on Predation
21.2 Rational Theories of Predation
21.2.1 The Long Purse
21.2.2 Reputation Models
21.2.3 Signaling Models of Predation
21.2.4 Softening Up the Victim
21.2.5 Predation in Learning and Network Industries
21.3 Empirical Evidence on Predation
21.3.1 Case Studies
21.3.2 Experimental Evidence
21.4 Predation in Antitrust
21.4.1 Areeda-Turner and Cost-Based Definitions of Predation
21.4.2 Major Antitrust Cases
21.5 Chapter Summary
21.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
21.7 Appendix: An Introduction to Games of Incomplete Information
21.7.1 Bayesian Games
21.7.2 Extensive-Form Bayesian Games with Observable Actions
21.7.3 Multiple but Finite Numbers of Victims in the Extortion Game
22 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints
22.1 Incentives for Vertical Merger Vertical Integration
22.1.1 Transaction Economies
22.1.2 Vertical Integration to Avoid Double Marginalization
22.1.3 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Fixed Proportions
22.1.4 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Variable Proportions
22.2 Vertical Restraints
22.2.1 Restraints on Intrabrand Competition
22.2.2 Alternative Explanations of RPM and Exclusive Territorial Restrictions
22.2.3 RPM, Exclusive Territories, and Welfare
22.2.4 Antitrust Policy toward RPM and Exclusive Territories
22.3 Contractual Exclusivity
22.3.1 Tying Arrangements
22.3.2 Exclusive Dealing
22.4 Chapter Summary
22.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
22.6 Appendix: Price versus Non-Price Competition in the Winter Model
23 Horizontal Mergers
23.1 A Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
23.1.1 Price versus Efficiency: The Williamson Trade Off
23.1.2 The Use of the Herfindahl Index in Merger Analysis
23.2 Equilibrium with Nonmerging Firms: A More General Analysis
23.2.1 Mergers in Differentiated Markets
23.3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers
23.4 Entry
23.5 Mergers: The Antitrust Framework
23.5.1 Merger Guidelines
23.5.2 Market Definition
23.5.3 Innovation Markets
23.5.4 Entry and Product Repositioning
23.5.5 Efficiencies: A Growing Emphasis
23.5.6 Methodology: The Growing Role of Simulation in Antitrust Analysis
23.6 Chapter Summary
23.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
23.8 Appendix: Bertrand Equilibrium with Three Differentiated Products
VI Issues in Regulatory Economics
24 Rationale for Regulation
24.1 Public Interest Justifications for Regulatory Intervention
24.1. l The Market Failure Test
24.1.2 Natural Monopoly
24.1.3 Large Specific Investments
24.2 The Economic Theories of Regulation
24.2.1 The Theory of Economic Regulation
24.2.2 Explaining Regulation Using a Principal-Agent Approach
24.3 Chapter Summary
24.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
24.5 Appendix: Subadditivity and Multiproduct Firms
25 Optimal Pricing for Natural Monopoly
25.1 Efficient Pricing by a Single-Product Natural Monopolist
25.1.1 First-Best Pricing
25.1.2 Second-Best Pricing: Ramsey Prices
25.1.3 First- vs. Second-Best Pricing
25.2 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly
25.2.1 Ramsey Pricing
25.3 Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.1 A Simple Illustrative Model of Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.2 Optimal Capacity
25.3.3 Discussion of Peak-Load Pricing
25.4 Multipart Tariffs
25.4.1 Two Common Examples of Multipart Tariffs
25.4.2 The Coase Result
25.4.3 N-Part Tariffs and a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs
25.4.4 Pareto-Dominating Block Tariffs
25.5 Chapter Summary
25.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
26 Issues in Regulation
26.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information
26.1.1 The Full-Information Benchmark
26.1.2 Asymmetric Information: The Importance of Distributional
Considerations
26.1.3 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Information
26.1.4 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Action
26.1.5 Implications for Regulatory Regimes
26.2 Regulation in Practice
26.2.1 Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.2 An Assessment of COS Regulation
26.2.3 Summary of Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.4 Incentive Regulation
26.2.5 Guidelines for Regulation
26.3 Regulatory Reform in Network Industries
26.3.1 Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets
26.3.2 Access Pricing and Interconnection
26.3.3 The Interconnection Problem
26.3.4 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
26.3.5 Optimal Access Pricing
26.4 Chapter Summary
26.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
Appendix The Legal Framework of Antitrust Enforcement
A.1 Antitrust in the United States
A.I.1 The Sherman Act
A. 1.2 The Clayton Act
A.I.3 Enforcement in the U.S.
A.2 Competition Policy in Canada
A.2.1 Criminal Provisions in the Competition Act
A.2.2 The Director of Research and Investigation
A.2.3 Noncriminal Reviewable Offenses
A.3 Competition Policy of the European Union
A.3.1 Enforcement in the EU
A.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
Selected Solutions for Odd Numbered Questions
Index of Names
Subject Index
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