书籍详情
策略理性模型:英文版

作者:(德)莱因哈德·泽尔滕(Reinhard Selten)著
出版社:北京经济学院出版社
出版时间:2000-06-01
ISBN:9787563808540
定价:¥36.00
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内容简介
本书辑入了作者关于博弈论的经典论文12篇。共分四个部分。第一部分为关于博弈论自身建设的三篇论文,著名的"颤抖手完美均衡点"概念即在第一篇论文中提出,它是对纳什均衡的深化与改进。第二部分为关于博弈理论应用的四篇论文,充分显示了博弈论强大的分析能力和广泛的运用性。第三部分的两篇论文,着重考察了合作博弈。第四部分"实验经济学",是作者关于博弈实验的研究成果的三篇论文。本书是博弈论研究的重要文献,体现了作者对非合作博弈的杰出贡献及博弈论的发展历程,也预示着博弈论今后的发展方向。读者对象:经济学专业师生、经济理论工作者、学者及研究人员。
作者简介
莱因哈德·泽尔滕(1930-)德国波恩大学教授。1994年因其在非合作博弈理论中开创性地均衡分析方面的杰出贡献,荣获诺贝尔经济学奖。
目录
Introduction
Acknowledgements
A STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM
1 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points
in Extensive Games
2 The Chain Store Paradox
3 A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts
B APPLIED GAME THEORY
4 A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping
5 A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,where 4 Are Few and 6Are Many
6 A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability
7 Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?
C COOPERATION
8 Bargaining under Incomplete Information-A Numerical Example
9 A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic-Function Bargaining
D EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
10 The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior
11 Coalition Probabilities in a Non-Cooperative Model of Three-Person Quota-Came Bargaining
12 Equal Divsion Payoff Bounds for 3-Person Characteristic Function Experiments
Author Index
Subject Index
Acknowledgements
A STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM
1 Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points
in Extensive Games
2 The Chain Store Paradox
3 A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts
B APPLIED GAME THEORY
4 A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping
5 A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,where 4 Are Few and 6Are Many
6 A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability
7 Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?
C COOPERATION
8 Bargaining under Incomplete Information-A Numerical Example
9 A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic-Function Bargaining
D EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
10 The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior
11 Coalition Probabilities in a Non-Cooperative Model of Three-Person Quota-Came Bargaining
12 Equal Divsion Payoff Bounds for 3-Person Characteristic Function Experiments
Author Index
Subject Index
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